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Abstract
Analyzing sample moments of survey forecasts, we derive disagreement and un-
certainty measures for the short- and medium term inflation outlook. The latter
provide insights into the development of inflation forecast uncertainty in the context
of a changing macroeconomic environment since the beginning of 2008. Motivated
by the debate on the role of monetary aggregates and cyclical variables describing a
Phillips-curve logic, we develop a macroeconomic indicator spread which is assumed
to drive forecasters’ judgments. Empirical evidence suggests procyclical dynamics
between disagreement among forecasters, individual forecast uncertainty and the
macro-spread. We call this approach the camp view of inflation forecasts and show
that camps form up whenever the spread widens.
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1 Introduction
Expectations are at the core of monetary economics with monetary policy anticipating
future developments and managing market expectations over the stance of the business
cycle. In particular, central banks’ ability to shape inflation expectations takes center
stage for the purpose of providing a nominal anchor and of guaranteeing stable prices
(Woodford 2003). Both from an academic and from a policy perspective, it is widely
accepted that given the time lags in monetary transmission, expectations provide evidence
about the likely future development of economic conditions; they allow monetary policy
to react in a forward-looking manner to obtain its political task of price (and output)
stability. This holds all the more because expectations can influence current economic
outcomes in terms of quantities and prices (ECB 2009b).
For the conduct of monetary policy, measures of expectations can be extracted either
from survey forecasts or from financial market data. Thereby, inflation expectations
are pivotal instruments which guide interest-rate decisions in board meetings. A jump
in inflation expectations might be associated with inflation scares which might call for
restrictive monetary policy actions in order to bring expectations down. If the change in
expectations represents the majority of forecasters, the signal for monetary policy is clear.
If, however, the analysis of inflation forecasts reveals that respondents disagree on their
inflation outlook, the mechanical response to the average forecast might even aggravate
heterogenous developments within the survey. High volatility in inflation expectations as
well as high disagreement among forecasters, thus, can pose great challenges for central
banks.
For the US, Leduc et al. (2009) report that disagreement about the future path of
inflation has risen substantially since the start of financial turmoil in 2008; similar findings
hold for the euro area as documented by Geiger and Sauter (2009). The analysis of surveys
reveals that disagreement substantially varies with the forecast horizon. Meanwhile some
forecasters expect much lower short-run inflation, others expect much higher long-run
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trend inflation. Within this environment, the national central bank has to deal with the
conflict of shaping both horizon-dependent inflation forecasts each separately calling for
different communication strategies.
Heterogeneity in inflation surveys reflects disagreement and inflation uncertainty. This
uncertainty can be associated with individual forecast uncertainty and uncertainty among
forecasters (Giordania and Soederlind 2003). Both measures can be constructed with
the help of individual probabilistic distributions of future inflation over different forecast
horizons. Though dynamics of inflation uncertainty for the US have been widely discussed
in the literature, little evidence can be found for the euro area.
Most importantly, the fact that inflation disagreement and inflation uncertainty change
over time raises the question for sources of such dynamics. At an intuitive level, the answer
would be to ascribe heterogeneity to different, but correlated information sets as well as to
the use of diverging real-time indicators on which survey participants estimate the future
path of inflation and other economic variables. Moreover, disagreement might evolve as a
reflex of diverging model views about the determination of inflation, in particular, to what
extent monetary actions influence consumer price inflation in the short- to medium term.
A bulk of research has worked on the driving forces of inflation emphasizing the role of
economic indicators and monetary aggregates for inflation determination - the theoretical
and empirical evidence is at least ambiguous.1
In our paper, we focus on data of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) for the
euro area and the US. Our findings provide insights into the evolution of inflation forecast
uncertainty in the context of a changing macroeconomic environment since the beginning
of 2008. Besides presenting stylized developments of 1-year and 5-year inflation forecasts,
the analysis matches disagreement and forecast uncertainty with a changing macroeco-
nomic environment. Against the background of aggravating financial turmoil that agitates
economic outlooks, we attribute rising forecast disagreement to heterogeinity within the
1 See Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2006), Woodford (2008) or McCallum and Nelson (2009)
among many other studies.
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group of forecasters. In particular, diverging opinions with regard to inflation prospects
may stem from a theory-specific weighting of forecast-relevant information. We assign
heterogenous beliefs to two different macro-theoretic camps, i.e. the “monetarist camp”
and the “Phillips-curve” camp, and develop an indicator spread that mirrors diverging
inflation outlooks. We call this approach the camp view of inflation forecasts.
The paper is structured as follows: chapter 2 reviews the underlying data set and
the applied theoretical measures on heterogeneity. Chapter 3 gives a description of the
empirical results for disagreement and uncertainty in survey data. Chapter 4 is dedi-
cated to the camp view of inflation forecasts where rising uncertainty among forecasters
is accompanied by decreasing individual uncertainty of forecasters. Finally, chapter 5
concludes.
2 Data Set and Measurement Concepts
In general, inflation expectations can be approximated in two ways: survey-based and
financial market-based measures. Within these two categories, several methods exist that
vary with respect to their specific form. For instance, ECB (2006) lists four different
surveys for the euro area differing in regard to inquiry frequency, forecast horizon and
survey participants as well as two financial market-based measures.
Although surveys deliver direct information on inflation expectations compared to
financial market data, they have several shortcomings. As mentioned by Giordania and
Soederlind (2003) and Croushore (1993), there is no guarantee that the respondents give
their best estimate. One could also think of tactical games or the fear of consequences
leading to biased and exaggerated answers. This source of error is tried to be reduced by
making the publication of the survey anonymous. Hence, this anonymity reduces the risk
of “wrong” forecasts and encourages the respondent to report what she really believes.
On the other hand, she can not be held accountable for her predictions eventually leading
to less precise forecasts. Due to the low survey frequency ranging from monthly up to
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biannually reports, they can not reflect behavioral changes properly. To this end, they
suffer from well known problems with the design of questionnaires (Galati et al. 2009).
Inflation expectations derived from financial data are predominantly based on infor-
mation given by the performance of inflation-linked bonds and swap-rates. As these data
are available in high frequency, changes in behavior can be examined quite well. But those
bonds tend to overestimate inflationary risks due to several additional risk-premia and
underestimate them because of an inherent liquidity premium. In addition, institutional
and technical issues arise, e.g. due to thin markets or tax distortions (ECB 2006).2
For our work we use survey data of the euro area and the US. The European Survey
of Professional Forecasters is provided by the ECB.3 It was established in early 1999 in
order to collect information of private sector forecasts on macroeconomic expectations
and captures expectations of HCPI as well as the expected rate of real GDP growth.
Within this survey, inflation expectations play a key role in signaling future risk to price
stability and provide information how market participants gauge these risks. The data set
contains point estimates for different time horizons reaching from the current year to a five-
year horizon depending on the evaluation date and is based on a quarterly questionnaire
taking place in the first month of the respective quarter, answered by experts affiliated
with financial and non-financial institutions rooted within the euro area.
Within the survey, the section of inflation expectations provides point estimates as well
as range estimates for different time horizons reaching from the current year to a five-
year horizon depending on the evaluation date. Due to the possibility of each participant
to provide a precise subjective probability distribution about her forecasts we can also
approximate individual uncertainty concerning point estimates (Garcia 2003; So¨derlind
2008).
2 An extensive analysis on the information content of interest rates is given in ECB (2000).
3 It is available for mean data on their web page www.ecb.int. We thank the Survey of Professional
Forecasters team for kindly providing us the individual data set; the latter being available on request
directly from the ECB.
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For US data, we base our analysis on the Survey of Professional Forecasters as it is
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.4 This survey, founded in 1968 by
the American Statistical Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research, cap-
tures, analogous to the European survey, inflation expectations on different time horizons;
unfortunately, long-term expectations (five-year ahead) are provided only since 2005.
Table (1) summarizes the design of our underlying survey data set as it is collected by
the ECB. This representation will be useful to illustrate the single steps for constructing
different uncertainty measures.
Table 1: Quarterly forecast setup
i vi s1 s2 . . . sm
1 v1 p11 p12 . . . p1m
2 v2 p21 p22 . . . p2m
. . . . . . . . . . . . pij . . .
n vn pn1 pn2 . . . pnm
The first column lists the respondents i ranging from 1 to n. The setup of the survey
is divided into two parts: direct point-forecasts vi and individual probability judgments
pij. The former do not contain probabilistic information regarding alternative future out-
comes whereas the latter explicitly do. Variable sj represents midpoints of the proposed
inflation-ranges or states within the survey (the number of intervals j ranging from 1
to m)5. Each row, beginning with s1, corresponds to the empirical distribution of the
individual probability judgments pij given by forecaster i. Provided consistent forecast
judgments, point forecasts should approximately equal the individually expected value of
future inflation µi given by
µi =
m∑
j=1
sjpij ≈ vi. (1)
4 The complete SPFUS for mean and individual forecasts can be downloaded from www.phil.frb.org.
5 Midpoints are given by 0.5 (uj−lj) where uj (lj) denotes the upper (lower) bound of the jth interval.
For a discussion of the use of uniform distributions vs. midpoints, see Giordania and Soederlind
(2003) and D’Amico and Orphanides (2008).
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As noted in Giordania and Soederlind (2003), typically three ways of representing the
data are common: (i) median point forecasts, (ii) dispersion of individual forecasts and (iii)
aggregate histograms. While median point forecasts (m0.5) as well as the upper and lower
quartile (m0.75,m0.25) are calculated appropriately, disagreement (dis) among forecasters
can be approximated by the dispersion of individually expected inflation (Giordania and
Soederlind 2003; D’Amico and Orphanides 2008). Therefore, equation (2) provides the
standard deviation in each quarter.6
dis =
√√√√1/n
n∑
i=1
(vi − v)2 (2)
Because a high standard deviation signals strong disagreement among forecasters7 we
will further refer to this as dis. Aggregated histograms (as shown later) are made up of
the information derived by previous techniques and give a comprehensive picture.
Hitherto, measures are extracted out of point forecasts vi. If the additional infor-
mation, given by the individual probabilistic estimates pij is taken into account, further
proxies of forecast uncertainty can be computed.
Following Giordania and Soederlind (2003) and D’Amico and Orphanides (2008),
firstly, we want to capture the (un)certainty of how individual forecasters judge infla-
tion scenarios. Technically speaking, this addresses the way probability mass will be
assigned to different columns sj. We will call this average (individual) forecast uncer-
tainty (afu). In general we assume that a forecaster will distribute probability mass more
uniform if she is less convinced (faces a higher degree of uncertainty) about a specific
state. The dispersion of future states assigned by a single forecaster can be estimated by
the individual forecast uncertainty
ifui =
√√√√
m∑
j=1
(sj − µi)2pij . (3)
6 Here, variable v¯ represents the mean point forecast in each quarter.
7 This is because of the dispersion of individual forecasts around the expected value, which takes all
estimates into account.
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Equation (3) captures the deviation of the midpoint sj from the point estimate of each
participant µi, multiplied by the probability pij given to the state by the respective par-
ticipant.
To summarize the overall evolution of forecasters’ uncertainty regarding their individ-
ual scenario choices within each quarter, we average the individual dispersions to get the
average individual forecast uncertainty
afu = 1/n
n∑
i=1
ifui
= 1/n
n∑
i=1
√√√√
m∑
j=1
(sj − µi)2pij
(4)
Secondly, we approximate average state uncertainty (asu) by equation (7) which is
derived as follows. Each quarter the averaged probability pj assessed to a future state sj
is given by
pj = 1/n
n∑
i=1
pij. (5)
Weighting midpoints sj with aggregated state probabilities pj results in the overall
aggregated forecast value
Es =
m∑
j=1
sjpj ≈ v. (6)
Equation (6) gives the expected (point) inflation forecast of all participants. The
standard deviation of the aggregated expected values of state outcomes asu indicates the
dispersion of the single state outcomes and can be interpreted as a useful proxy of inflation
forecast uncertainty
asu =
√√√√
m∑
j=1
(sj −Es)2pj. (7)
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3 Forecast Disagreement and Inflation Uncertainty
3.1 Point Forecasts of the Inflation Outlook
Figure (1) plots basic descriptive statistics on one-year ahead inflation expectations for the
euro area and the US beginning in 1999. It reports the median and mean point forecasts
as well as the upper and lower quartile calculated from the individual responses of the
survey. Since 1999, euro area short-term inflation expectations have fluctuated in the
bandwidth of 1.2 % to 2.4%. A slight upward trend can be documented beginning in the
second quarter of 2006 and peaking in the second quarter of 2008 against the background
of rallying commodity and food prices on a global level. With the financial crisis feeding
into goods markets, the short-term inflation outlook adjusted to a below 1%-level and the
latest available data confirm the overall assessment of low expected annualized inflation
for the upcoming year. As regards a first crude look on survey dispersion, the upper
and lower quartile are plotted against the respective survey dates. With the exception
of the point forecasts for the third quarter 2009, there is no trend of a widening or a
shrinking gap of point forecast responses. Only the latest results of the questionnaire
reflect a heightened amount of disagreement concerning the future short-term inflation
outlook. Indeed, Geiger and Sauter (2009) show that the spread between the maximum
and minimum forecasts has soared with the maximum forecasts not outperforming the
upper ceiling of previous projections; meanwhile the minimum forecasts are on a historical
low including deflationary expectations.
US one-year ahead inflation expectations are considerably stable over the sample pe-
riod. Median point forecasts range between 1.7% and 2.6% with dips in the first quarter
2004 and the second quarter 2009. The former can be attributed to the debate about
deflationary scares in 2003 (Bernanke 2003); the latter event mirrors the same reflex in
the euro area, i.e. the real effects of the financial crisis transmitting to goods- and labor
markets. In contrast to the findings for the euro area, the distance of the upper and lower
quartile is much wider, in particular for the latest quarter in 2009. Still, the mean and
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median point estimates do not show signs of a sharp drop as is the case for the consumer
price index in the euro area. However, short-term expectations are likewise characterized
by a high max-min spread where increased disagreement about the outlook reflects the
fact that some forecasters are predicting much lower inflation than before the financial
crisis.8
Recent developments of long-term inflation expectations are displayed in figure (2).
In the euro area, the 5-year outlook of inflation has been fluctuating between 1.8% and
2% from 2001 to 2009 and has converged to the officially announced inflation target of
maintaining inflation rates below, but close to 2% over the medium term. The upper
quartile has been generally stable at 2% with the exception of a small increase in the
third quarter of the year 2008. This outcome can be interpreted as a success of the ECB
in communicating its explicit inflation target to the public. The lower quartile supports
this view since it has progressively adjusted from a low of 1.5% to 1.9% since mid 2006.
Compared to findings of the US, long-term inflation expectations tend to exhibit both
a lower level and less volatility across the sample period (note the scaling of the vertical
axis for the US in relation to the euro area). The survey measure fluctuates between
2.0% and 2.8% where expectations have rapidly fallen during the financial crisis. The
upper quartile has risen in the third quarter 2009, whereas the lower quartile is still below
1.8% which indicates a remarkable disagreement among respondents about the long-term
inflation outlook.
We now turn to evidence about the degree of consensus in beliefs about inflation
dynamics in the short-term and medium-term future. We illustrate disagreement about
inflation expectations with two measures, i.e. the standard deviation of point estimates of
the respondents and the inter-quartile range of the ranked survey set for a particular sur-
vey date. In regard to short-term inflation expectations, the upper left graph of figure (3)
8 See Geiger and Sauter (2009) or Leduc et al. (2009). The latter authors do not calculate max-min
spreads, but report evidence about the averages of the highest and lowest quartiles of the forecasts;
they come to the same conclusion that the increased disagreement is owed to a bias towards lower
expected inflation rather than higher expected inflation.
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Figure 1: Short-Term Inflation Expectations in the Euro Area and the USA
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shows the first measure for individual point forecasts. Eye-catching is that disagreement
is more distinct for the US than for the euro area across the entire sample. Moreover,
for both regions, the dispersion measure more than doubled, as distortions on financial
markets sent its first waves on goods- and labour markets in 2007/08. The difference of
disagreement between the two surveys is less pronounced when plotting the inter-quartile
range (IQR) against the survey dates in the upper right graph. Still, we can observe a
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Figure 2: Long-Term Inflation Expectations in the Euro Area and the US
5-year Inflation Expectations - euro area
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clear upward trend for both IQRs starting in 2007 for the US and in 2008 for the euro
area.
Dispersion of 5-year point forecasts as measured by its standard deviation follows a
similar pattern as its 1-year counterpart, albeit the latest available survey hints to rather
stabilizing developments. In terms of the corresponding IQRs, the data for the US point
to ongoing disagreement about long-term inflation expectations with a peak in the third
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quarter 2009. The opposite holds for the euro-area survey according to which there is a
clear consensus emerging between professional forecasters; form 2001 onwards, its IQR
has steadily fallen and reached a low value of 0.1% on average.
Figure 3: Dispersion Measures of Inflation Expectations
Standard Deviation 1-year forecast Inter-Quartile Range 1-year forecast
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Figure (4) provides a stylized illustration that matches the information of a chang-
ing mean and the underlying evolution of disagreement.9 Against this background, the
approximated theoretical normal distributions are plotted for the last four quarters of
available surveys. Again, the upper part displays results for one-year ahead estimates
and the lower graphs belong to the 5-year counterparts.
9 The basic idea is to augment the outcomes of the point forecasts to a “sufficient” large number
of respondents by assuming a normal distribution for the point forecasts with given mean and
standard deviation. This strategy of simplification allows to draw joint implications for average
inflation expectations and its dispersion for particular survey dates.
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The stylized probability density functions for the one-year point forecasts reflect the
observations of figure (1) with a high variability of the mean response for the euro area.
For instance, the bell for the fourth quarter 2008 indicates a mean response of 2% points
for annualized inflation with a standard deviation of 0.4. Over time, these estimates have
changed by switching to a mean of roughly 1.2% and a standard deviation of 0.5. The
widening of the bell can also be documented for the US but the mean forecasts remain
rather stable.
Turning to long-term inflation expectations for the euro area, the probability mass
centers around the mean of the inflation forecasts. An exception is the second quarter
of 2009 where disagreement has manifested itself by a high dispersion. For the US, the
location of the approximated density functions varies with a tendency of increasing bells
for the latest surveys (note again the different scaling of the figures for both countries).
In sum, the descriptive analysis of point forecasts confirms previous studies with dif-
ferent survey sources and sample periods whereby long-term inflation expectations are
more firmly anchored in the euro area than in the US.10 Although, since the start of
EMU in 1999, the participating countries have been hit by a number of consumer price
shocks in both directions, it appears that 5-year point expectations are broadly consistent
with the numerical inflation target by the ECB. This evidence is supported by the fact
that expectations are marginally altered by short-term changes in inflation expectations
as documented in figure (1) so that there is no clear relationship between movements in
short-term and longer-term inflation expectations (ECB 2009b). Short-term deviations
are mainly driven by the business cycle stance and do not alter the long-term inflation
outlook. Along similar lines, macroeconomic releases about latest consumer price data or
about goods- and labor market indicators have no significant impact on long-term infla-
tion expectations extracted from financial-market based measures - the opposite holds for
the US (Gu¨rkaynak et al. 2005; Ehrmann et al. 2007). US long-term treasury securities
significantly react to a variety of macroeconomic and monetary policy surprises which
10 Anchoring evidence can be found in Castelnuovo et al. (2003); Beechey et al. (2008).
14
Figure 4: Theoretical Normal Distribution of Point Forecasts
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may reflect changing views on part of market participants about long-term inflation in
the absence of a communicated numerical inflation target by the FED.
So far, we have analyzed the responds of point forecasts of the inflation outlook for
the euro area and the US. In what follows, we concentrate on the individual probability
distributions (histograms) for the euro area. For the US, individual data of the survey of
consumer price inflation only start at 2005, so that statements about individual dispersion
and uncertainty are rather limited. Previous work on US forecast uncertainty has taken
GDP deflator inflation as object of investigation and evidence can be found in Giordania
and Soederlind (2003) and So¨derlind (2009). In order to avoid a possible bias due to
different inflation measures, we do not use the US GDP deflator data set. Instead, the
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focus in the preceding section is on the euro area exclusively, in particular, because to
our best knowledge we could not find any work that has applied a rigorous analysis of
individual histograms for the euro area.
3.2 Heterogeneity and Inflation Uncertainty in Individual Sur-
vey Forecasts
This section compares the two measures of inflation uncertainty derived from the individ-
ual distributions and the disagreement measure extracted from the point forecasts. The
aim is to study how the variables have evolved over the sample period. As documented in
figure (5), our state uncertainty measure asu is represented by the grey line and the aver-
age individual uncertainty proxy afu by the black line. Starting with the 1-year horizon,
the time series of inflation uncertainty asu can be characterized as a stable process until
the end of 2007 - with a small significant hump in 2003/04. It has fluctuated between
0.2 and 0.4 % before it has sky-rocked to a sharp increase in 2008. Average individual
inflation uncertainty (afu) as well as disagreement (dis) derived from the point forecasts
co-move with overall state uncertainty indicating a high correlation between the three
variables.11
When inspecting 5-year inflation uncertainty, the time series are smoother compared
to their 1-year horizon counterparts which represents the conventional view that long-
term inflation expectations should be more anchored compared to short-run fluctuations
(see the different scaling of axis). Such observation should manifest in lower uncertainty
among forecasters. In addition, we can document a small downward trend in inflation
uncertainty starting in 2004. This may stem from an enhanced ECB monetary policy
strategy with its clarification of price stability.12 Again, the uncertainty measures are
11 A comparison of survey forecast uncertainty with financial-based measures of inflation risk premia
confirms recent dynamics (ECB 2009a). Volatility of break-even forward inflation rates has soared
during the same period in which forecast uncertainty has increased though the findings might have
been distorted by technical and liquidity factors.
12 Typically, one would expect a positive correlation between inflation uncertainty and the level of
inflation expectations (Evans and Wachtel 1993).
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strongly positively correlated so that an increase in uncertainty among forecasters is
associated with an increase in individual uncertainty.
Figure 5: Disagreement (dis) and forecast uncertainty (afu, asu), euro area
1-year forecasts, dis right axis 5-year forecasts, dis right axis
As can be seen, forecast uncertainty shows a significant jump since 2007:Q4 for both
survey horizons. This means averaged probability assignments pij regarding different
states sj have been increasingly varying ever since documenting a rising overall (state)
uncertainty (asu) with regard to inflation prospects. The latter is highly correlated with
the disagreement measure (dis) derived from point forecasts (ρ = 0.90 for 1-year forecasts
and ρ = 0.70 for 5-year forecasts).13
Average individual forecast uncertainty (afu), in turn, increases sharply since 2008:Q2
indicating a distribution of individual probability mass pi that has become much more
wider on average - in other words, has concentrated on more states sj - compared to
the time span before. This fact documents that forecasters have lost confidence in their
individual judgements. At the same time disagreement among forecasters has risen.
13 Due to their construction, these indicators show a narrow pro-cyclical co-movement (see also Gior-
dania and Soederlind 2003).
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One possible explanation attempt could be that one might think of diverging opinions
in regard to the future evolution of inflation. Such views may be attributed to different
theoretical perspectives about how inflation is determined. The proportion of forecasters
sticking to a specified model view may change over the course of the business cycle depend-
ing on the diffusion of information, in particular on the validity of indicators to produce
small forecast errors for future inflation. In what follows, we provide a systematization of
empirical results on inflation uncertainty and we try to link them to the ongoing debate
about the indicator role of monetary and business cycle variables for future inflation.
4 Forming up the “Camps”
What predominantly strikes us is the enormous increase of individual forecast uncertainty
(afu) since 2008:Q2 for both forecasting maturities as well as the hike for the evolution of
disagreement (dis) and state uncertainty (asu). Matching the types of indicators suggests
that the financial crisis aggravates forecast uncertainty. A plausible explanation for this
finding might be the existence of diverging opinions with respect to the future evolution
of inflation due to opposing model views of inflation determination.
It might reflect different groups of forecasters within the survey that contrast in re-
gard to their theoretical conviction. Different judgements might be based on individual
forecasters’ theoretical heritage due to their education and their affiliation to scientific
camps. Alternatively, the camp view can be interpreted in a more pragmatic way mirror-
ing simply the forecasting power of macro-based indicators for future inflation. Stronger
signals from the macroeconomic environment may favor a scope of decisions where high
uncertainty about the medium-term outlook pushes forecasters to take a firm stand in
terms of a model view though individual uncertainty may still be eminent. Such an inter-
pretation implies that forecasters shift their mean estimates within the probability space
either to the right or the left but allocate the probability mass to a wider range of states.
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Since 2008:Q3, the dispersion of inflation scenarios might have been amplified by
the divergence of macroeconomic key indicators that play a central role within specific
theoretical interpretations. Meanwhile monetary figures such as the annualized growth
of the monetary aggregate M1 experience double digit growth, indicators that mirror
business cycle conditions show weak tendencies of a re-bounding economy.
According to the setup of the survey in table (1), figure (6) illustrates the camp view by
contrasting two basic concepts of inflation determination. The first view sticks to mone-
tarist beliefs where survey participants build inflation expectations by observing monetary
developments. The second camp (PC) derives inflation judgements from a Phillips-curve
based logic of inflation determination where inflation expectations are driven by the out-
look of real cyclical activity. The representation implies (i) a vertical ranking of forecasters
i in regard to their individual theoretical preferences that might reflect their voting and
(ii) the PC-group is supposed to assign significantly more probability mass to states sj
that correspond to comparably low future inflation.
Figure 6: Survey Setups and Macro Camps

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In view of the strong distortions most economies have been hit by since 2008 and
the different inflation prospects that have been discussed in the aftermath - reaching
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from deflation scares to (hyper-) inflation scenarios - the camp view offers an explanation
to the enormous rise in forecast disagreement.14 While one would expect forecasters
that predominantly base their survey-judgements on monetary indicators to support a
significant rise in inflation as a medium-term scenario due to extremely expansionary
monetary policy and huge fiscal stimulus in many countries, economists focussing on
production gaps should tend to anticipate low inflation or - considering the fact of the
tremendous global downturn in demand - even tend to vote in favor of deflationary scares.
This interpretation is in line with our empirical results presented above. As illustrated
in figure (1), short-term prospects from 2008:Q3 onwards might have been dominated by
severe recessionary judgements. Rising inflation disagreement (figure 3) and increasing
averaged state uncertainty (figure 5) account for a significant number of forecasters who
favor relatively higher expectations. Such a judgement could be justified by medium-term
inflation fears and support the assumption of (co-) existing monetary beliefs within the
pool of respondents of the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
However, our assumptions not only seem to match the developments within the times-
pan from 2008:1 onwards. As will be illustrated, the data provide further empirical evi-
dence for the basic statements of the camp view over the whole observation period. Within
corresponding regression analyses we notice that all signs of the estimated coefficients are
consistent with our theoretical considerations.
14 The debate about inflation vs. deflation is (still) on the top agenda of both the financial press and
research academia. The main discourse about likely outcomes concentrates on the question whether
central banks are willing to withdraw the liquidity they provided in the aftermath of the Lehman
Brothers collapse with the scope of stabilizing inter-banking markets. Various ‘exit’ strategies have
been communicated by major monetary authorities in order to guide market participants over the
medium-term. ECB president J.-C. Trichet (2009) recently remarked that “[t]he exit strategy, in
the end, will need to be invoked at the precise time in which the traditional link between broad
money and our provision of liquidity to the banking system will re-establish itself. This calls for a
constant and careful monitoring of the conditions at which the Eurosystem supplies central bank
credit to banks in view of the evolution of the economy and of markets expectations.” Moreover,
deficit-driven actions of national fiscal authorities to stimulate effective demand through expenditure
programs resemble a huge fiscal stimulus. Some observers call for heightened alertness in terms of
central bank independence (Meltzer 2009). Any move on part of central banks to initiate increasing
interest rates could provoke the danger of political pressure once increasing interest-rate burdens
would constrain the room of future fiscal maneuver.
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In order to highlight the mechanism that we suppose to be the major force driving fore-
cast dispersion and uncertainty, we focus on the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates
that serve as fundamental indicators for the creation of camp-specific inflation expecta-
tions. For this purpose we approximate a spread of macroeconomic signals by
isprdt = ln(M1t/Yt) − y
GAP
t . (8)
The information reflected by monetary growth relative to the growth of real GDP
ln(M1t/Yt) on the one hand and the output gap y
GAP
t on the other hand is supposed
to capture the degree of divergence with regard to the macroeconomic environment from
which inflation forecasts evolve.15
Explorative regression analysis and the checking of fitted residuals, further supported
by formal test evidence, indicate that our time series dis t, afut, asut and isprd t are inte-
grated of order 1. Table (5) in the appendix reports the results of the corresponding unit
root tests. We complement the findings of an Augmented Dickey-Fuller-Test (ADF) and
a Phillips-Perron-Test (PP) by the results of a Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares
analysis (DFGLS, see Elliott et al. (1996)). Note that the results of ADF and PP are
not perfectly in line with the DFGLS outcomes. Due to its better performance within
small samples we base our analysis on the DFGLS-results and continue by taking first
differences (FD) to estimate the relationships via Ordinary Least Squares. In order to
improve the model fit we consider additional lags of dependent variables. The absence
of serial correlation of the disturbances is checked by a Breusch-Godfrey test. Additional
reference regressions based on a Prais-Winsten correction as well as white-noise analysis
of the OLS-residuals confirm our findings.
Table (2) summarizes our estimation results for the 1-year forecast data of the euro
area. The regression of disagreement ∆dis t on the spread of macro indicators ∆isprd t
yields a positive sign which is significant on the 5-percent level. Regressing ∆afut and
15 Data are taken from the ECB and OECD Economic Outlook.
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∆asut on ∆isprd t documents positive coefficient estimates that are significant on the
1-percent level.
Table 2: Regression results: 1-year Forecasts, euro area
1999:1-2009:3 FD: ∆dis t = .609
∗∗ ∆isprd t se (.231)
1999:1-2009:3 FD: ∆afut = .285
∗∗∗ ∆isprd t se (.127)
1999:1-2009:3 FD: ∆asut = .725
∗∗∗ ∆isprd t se (.179)
Levels of significance: ∗ ∗ ∗ 1% ∗∗ 5% ∗ 10%
Table (3) illustrates the corresponding results for the 5-year forecasts of the euro area.
The regression of ∆dis t on the quarterly change of the macrospread (∆isprd t) indicates
a procyclical co-variation that is reported statistically significant on the 5-percent level.
The corresponding regressions of ∆afut and ∆afut also yield positive coefficient estimates
that are significant on the 1-percent and 5-percent levels.16
Table 3: Regression results: 5-year Forecasts, euro area
2001:1-2009:3 FD: ∆dis t = .047
∗∗ ∆isprd t se (.023)
2001:1-2009:3 FD: ∆afut = .543
∗∗ ∆isprd t se (.193)
2001:1-2009:3 FD: ∆asut = .681
∗∗∗ ∆isprd t se (.163)
Levels of significance: ∗ ∗ ∗ 1% ∗∗ 5% ∗ 10%
16 The regressions of ∆dist and ∆afut on ∆isprd t include 2 additional lags of the dependent variables.
The regression of ∆asut on ∆isprd t includes 1 additional dependent lag and requires a Newey-West
correction for serial correlation of 2 lags.
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Finally, table (4) illustrates the regression outcomes for 1-year forecast disagreement
and the macro-spread within the US. Here we also report a positive coefficient estimate
that is significant on the 5-percent level.17
Table 4: Regression results: 1-year Forecast, US
1999:2-2009:2 FD: ∆dis t = .659
∗∗ ∆isprd t se (.307)
Levels of significance: ∗ ∗ ∗ 1% ∗∗ 5% ∗ 10%
All in all, we conclude that (i) within both areas changes in disagreement among fore-
casters co-vary significantly with the stylized macroeconomic divergence in a procyclical
manner. Moreover, we notice (ii) that for the euro area the quarterly changes of the
macrospread is also positively connected to forecast uncertainty. As the quality of the
pattern holds for the whole observation period the data support our camp view interpre-
tation of inflation forecast dispersion.
5 Conclusion
Motivated by the debate on the role of monetary aggregates and cyclical variables de-
scribing a Phillips-curve logic we analyze disagreement and uncertainty of inflation ex-
pectations derived from survey forecasts for the euro area and the US. We find increasing
disagreement for the 1-year and 5-year horizon where long-term expectations are more
anchored in the euro area than in the US.
Against the background of aggravating financial turmoil that agitates economic out-
looks, we attribute the extraordinary rise in disagreement to heterogeneity within the
group of forecasters. In particular, diverging opinions with regard to inflation forecasts
17 Due to the relatively high volatility of disagreement (dist) for the US (see figure 3) we base the
regression on a 4-quarter moving average of the basic time series. Since the 5-year point forecast
time series for the US only starts in 2005, we cannot include it in the regression analysis.
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may stem from a theory-specific weighting of forecast-relevant information observed from
the macroeconomic system. We call this explanation the camp view of inflation forecasts.
Since each forecast rests on a theoretical conviction of inflation determination, we form
up two groups, i.e. the monetarist camp and the PC camp, whereas the latter derives
inflation judgments from a Phillips-curve logic. To this end, a macro indicator spread is
constructed from a monetary aggregate and real output data. Regression analysis provides
further evidence that camps form up whenever the macro indicator spread widens. Since
this pattern holds for the entire sample period, inflation forecasts do indicate latent camp-
affiliation.
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Appendix
Table 5: Unit root tests
Level First Differences
euro area ADF PP DFGLS ADF PP DFGLS
1-year dist -0.380 -0.887 -0.902 -5.426
∗∗∗ -5.444∗∗∗ -2.778∗∗∗
afut 0.302 0.595 -0.801 -7.077
∗∗∗ -7.055∗∗∗ -3.705∗∗
asut 1.747 0.964 -0.598 -4.634
∗∗∗ -4.730∗∗∗ -3.050∗
5-year dist -2.952
∗∗ -2.863∗∗ -1.268 -8.507∗∗∗ -8.589∗∗∗ -3.742∗∗
afut -3.273 -3.299 -1.278 -8.418
∗∗∗ -8.792∗∗∗ -3.593∗∗
asut -2.550 -2.680
∗ -1.049 -8.608∗∗∗ -8.607∗∗∗ -3.336∗
isprdt -0.376 -1.685 -2.539 -3.411
∗∗ -3.624∗∗∗ -2.068∗∗
Level First Differences
US ADF PP DFGLS ADF PP DFGLS
1-year dist 0.314 -0.244 -2.849 -3.789
∗∗∗ -3.834∗∗∗ -3.005∗∗∗
isprdt 0.695 -0.368 -2.156 -3.416
∗∗ -3.450∗∗∗ -3.581∗∗
Significance levels: ∗ ∗ ∗ 1% ∗∗ 5% ∗ 10%
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